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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The objective of this market analysis is to estimate the impact of a set-aside program where
five of the major grain and oilseed producing countries/regions of the world agree to reduce
their area dedicated to grains and oilseeds by 10 percent of a historical base. The five
countries are Argentina, Australia, Canada, the European Union and the United States. The
main focus of the analysis is two scenarios where we simulate a shift in supply by reducing
the area available for production in these countries/regions:
• from 1999 through 2001 in the first scenario
• from 1999 through 2006 in the second scenario.
However, we examine four scenarios to give an indication of the sensitivity of the results
when some participants are removed from the program.
Because of the relatively low demand elasticity for food, the price impact on grains and
oilseeds resulting from the introduction of a 10 percent set-aside program by these five major
exporting countries/regions is significant in the short term. In the second and third years of
the set-aside program (2000 and 2001), the prices for wheat, corn and soybean range from
26 percent to 32 percent above baseline levels but are still below the high levels observed in
the mid-1990s. Following the removal of the set-aside program, all the major grain and
oilseed commodity prices return to baseline levels relatively quickly. The results suggest
that a permanent set-aside program would be necessary to keep prices from returning to
relatively low baseline levels.
To get some indication of the impact of a permanent 10 percent set-aside program on
international markets, we undertook the second scenario. With the set-aside program in
place until 2006, the average impact is obviously stronger but the results show a declining
effect over time.
Two factors limit the size of the price increase under a permanent set-aside program —
slippage and free riding. Introducing a 10 percent shift in supply (through reduced area)
will not necessarily translate into a 10 percent reduction in the quantity of grains and oilseeds
produced by these five countries—slippage. Increasing production above baseline levels by
non-participating countries also undercuts the program—free riding. On average, over the
last five years of the permanent set-aside program scenario (2002–2006), because of slippage
and free riding only 32 percent of the original shift in supply is reflected in the world
harvested area of those commodities. When higher yields are taken into account, only
27 percent of the potential production reduction materializes on average in the last five years
of the scenario.
Free riding has been the major cause of failure of past supply reduction initiatives (and/or
public stock holdings) experience—from maple syrup in Quebec and cocoa in Ivory Coast to
cereals in the United States and wool in Australia. The results of this analysis are consistent
with these past experiences.
The impact on world prices is considerably less if the European Union and the United
States were unwilling to participate because they already have substantial land diversionvi A Market Analysis of a Set-aside Program
programs. The impact is further lessened if Canada were the only country to undertake the
10 percent set-aside program.
The large increases in feed prices resulting from a set-aside program would have a negative
global impact on the profitability of livestock producers. The benefit of a set-aside program
to agriculture as a whole would be seriously mitigated by this increase in cost to livestock
producers.A Market Analysis of a Set-aside Program vii
FOREWORD
Nominal grain and oilseed prices have declined dramatically from the high levels observed
in the mid-1990s.  As a result, it has been suggested by some industry stakeholders that
measures should be taken to limit world crop supplies to raise prices.
One such measure is a set-aside program involving a number of participants that would
significantly reduce the quantity of land in production over a certain period of time. In fact,
the European Union and the United States currently have set-aside programs that, together,
already have had a positive effect on crop prices. Set-aside programs could also become
relevant if the use of the World Trade Organization blue box is extended to more countries
after the next round of negotiations.
This analysis focuses on the quantitative aspects of a substantial multi-country, multi-
commodity, set-aside program and its impact on major agricultural commodity prices. Three
main conclusions can be drawn from the analysis:
• A permanent set-aside program would be necessary to keep prices from returning to
relatively low levels
• Even with a permanent set-aside program, the results show a declining effect over time
mostly because of additional production by non-participating countries and because of
crop substitution in favour of cereals and oilseeds and higher yield in participating
countries.
• For a set-aside program to have any significant impact on prices, the program must
include many commodities in many countries.
A program involving Canada alone is doomed to fail. And given that the United States and
the European Union—two large producers—already have their respective set-aside
programs, it might be difficult to convince them to participate in an international effort.A Market Analysis of a Set-aside Program 1
Introduction
Nominal grain and oilseed prices
have declined dramatically from
the high levels observed in the mid-
1990s (Figure 1). Real prices
continue to exhibit the downward
trend that has been present through
much of the 1900s. While it is
debatable whether or not current
real prices of grains and oilseeds
are below the trend, it is apparent
that grain and oilseed prices have
declined considerably and that
nominal and real cash receipts
obtained from the same volume of grain sold today are generally much lower than that
received in the mid-1990s.
Given the relatively sharp decline in grain and oilseed prices that was observed in the latter
half of the 1990s, it was suggested that measures should be taken to limit world crop supplies
to raise prices. One such measure is a set-aside program involving a number of participants
that would significantly reduce the quantity of land in production over a certain period of
time. The program could be removed after crop prices returned to a level that was deemed
reasonable. Set-aside programs could also become relevant if the use of the World Trade
Organization blue box1 is extended to more countries after the next round of negotiations.
This analysis focuses on the quantitative aspects of a substantial multi-country set-aside
program and its impact on major agricultural commodity prices.
The objective of this analysis is to estimate the impact of a set-aside program where five of
the major grain and oilseed producing countries/regions of the world agree to reduce their
area dedicated to these crops by 10 percent. The five countries are Argentina, Australia,
Canada, the European Union and the United States.2 In the first scenario, we used the
1. The blue box designates direct payments involving production-limiting features if such payments are
based on fixed area and yields or are made on 85 percent or less of the base level of production.





















Expon. (Real (1992$))2 A Market Analysis of a Set-aside Program
average harvested area in a recent historical period to determine the base area for each
region. We then assumed that each region would commit to removing 10 percent of this
historical base area from production for three consecutive years (1999–2001). In 2002, all
parties exit the set-aside program and allow the area to come back into production. We
quantitatively assessed the impact of the set-aside program on international agricultural
markets using the AGLINK model.3 We simulated a second scenario, involving the same
assumptions but over an eight-year period (1999–2006). Finally, we examined two alternative
scenarios to give some indication of the sensitivity of the results when some participants are
removed from the program.
2. These five countries/regions were consistently used for wheat, coarse grains and oilseeds. For oilseeds,
this choice resulted in the exclusion of three major exporters: palm oil from Indonesia and Malaysia and
soybeans from Brazil.
3. AGLINK is a multi-commodity, multi-country, policy-specific dynamic model of the international
agricultural markets built by the OECD with member countries.A Market Analysis of a Set-aside Program 3
Background
The five major exporters included
in this analysis account for a
significant share of world
agricultural land used in the
production of grains and oilseeds.
The average share  (1996–1998) of
world harvested area and
production for wheat, coarse grains
and oilseeds of these major
producers is shown in Figure 2.
4
For the wheat harvested area, the
five major exporting countries
accounted for 31 percent of the
world total over the 1996–1998
period but 38 percent of world production because of relatively higher yields than the world
average. For the coarse grains, the big five accounted for only 24 percent of the world
harvested area on average. However, dramatically higher coarse grain yields result in
48 percent of world production. For the three major oilseeds which dominate the
international oilseed trade, these five countries accounted for 46 percent of harvested area
and 58 percent of world production.
In total, these five countries accounted for 30 percent of world harvested area and due to the
substantially higher average yields in these countries, they accounted for 46 percent (almost
half) of world production of these major commodity groups. Given that the production
shares vary across commodity groups, one would expect that the initial price impact would
be the largest on those commodity groups for which these five countries occupy the largest
share of world production (i.e. coarse grains and oilseeds).
4. The commodity aggregations used are found in the AGLINK model. The aggregates for wheat, coarse
grains and oilseeds, respectively, include all wheat including durum; corn, barley, sorghum, oats, rye and














Figure 2: Major exporters’ (big five) share of world harvested 
area and production4 A Market Analysis of a Set-aside Program
In addition to the big five accounting for a significant proportion of world harvested area
and production, their relative shares of world grain and oilseed trade is even more
substantial. They accounted for 85 percent, 84 percent and 69 percent of world wheat, coarse
grain and oilseed exports, respectively. Based on the relative area, production and export
shares of the big five exporters, a 10 percent reduction in land available for grains and
oilseeds production would translate into a significant reduction in production and exports
and would positively affect world grain and oilseed prices.A Market Analysis of a Set-aside Program 5
Scenario development
We used a baseline as a benchmark from which to compare the scenarios undertaken in this
analysis. This baseline is a slightly modified version of Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada
(AAFC) September 2000 Medium Term Policy Baseline
5. Since we wanted to measure the
effect of the set-aside program over the longest period possible, the starting year for the
analysis was 1999. As such, the absolute values returned by the analysis should not be
interpreted as a forecast for the future. Instead the focus should be on the relative size of the
changes when comparing the simulation to the original baseline.
A main focus of this analysis is the
first scenario where a shift in
supply was simulated by reducing
the area available for production in
the big five exporting countries/
regions in 1999, 2000 and 2001. The
size of the shift in area corresponds
to 10 percent of the average grain
and oilseed harvested area in those
five countries over the 1996–1998
period. See Figure 3 for the
absolute size of the supply shift
introduced for each country. The
total area reduction is about
20 million hectares and represents three percent of the world harvested area of these
commodities over the 1996–1998 period.
In addition, we undertook three other scenarios. The second scenario extends the 10 percent
set-aside program over the duration of the baseline (1999–2006). The third scenario reduces
the number of countries and assumes that the European Union, through its 10 percent
mandatory set-aside program, and the United States, through its Conservation Reserve
Program, have already met their 10 percent commitment. The situation for Argentina,
Australia and Canada is unchanged (i.e. they each apply the 10 percent set-aside program).
5. Provisions of the 2002 USA Farm Bill are not included in the model and the baseline.























s6 A Market Analysis of a Set-aside Program
The fourth scenario measures the relative impact at the world level if Canada undertakes a
set-aside program on its own.
To summarize, we have four scenarios with 10 percent set-aside programs:
• Argentina, Australia, Canada, European Union and the United States, three years (1999–
2001)
• same five countries/regions, eight years (1999–2006)
• only three countries (Argentina, Australia, Canada), three years (1999–2001)
• only Canada, three years (1999–2001)A Market Analysis of a Set-aside Program 7
Model and baseline
We used the AGLINK model with minor modifications to estimate the international impact
of a set-aside program introduced by the five largest exporters. AGLINK includes coverage
for Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, the Former Soviet Union,
Hungary, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, the United States, and a rest of the
world component. The economic variables covered by the model include 50 market clearing
prices at the world, regional and national levels, production, consumption, trade and stocks.
Commodities covered at an aggregate level include wheat, rice, coarse grains, oilseeds,
oilseed meals, vegetable oils, beef, pork, sheep meat, wool, poultry, eggs, milk and a variety
of dairy products.
Before a discussion of the results from the analysis, we provide some background regarding
the baseline from which we compared the scenarios. The international baseline is generally
characterized by modest nominal grain and oilseed prices in the near term with prices rising
over the medium term. Although nominal prices are rising in the baseline, they are still well
below the levels observed in the mid-1990s. Given the absolute price levels in the baseline,
two policies influence the international grain and oilseed markets. The first is the US loan
rate for soybeans which results in a continued US oversupply due to favourable program
payments (i.e. significant soybean loan deficiency payments through 2004). The second is a
relatively weak euro which allows the European Union to export wheat without subsidy
starting in 2001 and continuing over the duration of the baseline (until 2006).
The question of whether the European Union is exporting with or without subsidy ultimately
has implications for the scenario results. If the European Union is exporting with subsidy, the
domestic price is effectively higher than the world market price and thereby disconnected
from the supply and demand signals in the international market place. As such, an increase
in the European Union set-aside program does little to help reduce supplies on the world
market. However, if the European Union is exporting without subsidy and thereby
effectively tied to the world market, a reduction in supply will contribute to reducing
supplies on international markets and increasing world price levels.
Given these two situations, one might question the value of including the European Union in
the set-aside program since their wheat exports without subsidy is only possible in the final
year of the set-aside program (2001). Since the differential between the world and the8 A Market Analysis of a Set-aside Program
European Union wheat price is relatively small, a change in the supplies of the other four
major exporting countries could influence the European Union trade position. Thus, the
inclusion of the European Union in the set-aside program is essential.
As an additional point, we made a modification to the European Union beef component of
the model which assumes that beef prices remain at the purchasing price of the intervention
system over the duration of the baseline. This modification is more consistent with the new
market realities emerging as a result of the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) crisis
that spread to a number of European Union member countries.A Market Analysis of a Set-aside Program 9
Results
Six subjects are addressed in this
section:
• price impact
•s u p p l y  r e s p o n s e
• livestock sector




As one would expect, the impact
on grain and oilseed prices
resulting from the introduction of
a 10 percent set-aside program by
the five major exporting countries
is significant in the short term. See
Figure 4 for the impact on grain
and oilseed commodity prices of
maintaining such a program for
three years.
In the first year (1999), wheat, corn
and soybean prices would increase
14 percent, 33 percent and 31 per-
cent,6 respectively.
A key factor influencing the lower
impact on wheat price in the first
year is directly related to the












































































































































































































































































































Set-aside Base10 A Market Analysis of a Set-aside Program
relative wheat prices in the international and European Union markets in 1999. Since
European Union wheat prices are higher than international prices in 1999, their wheat
market is disconnected from the world grain market. As such, the additional set-aside area in
the European Union acts as an increase to the EU internal wheat price and does not reduce
the available supplies on the international market.7 I n  e f f e c t ,  o n l y  A r g e n t i n a ,  A u s t r a l i a ,
Canada and the United States contribute to the reduction of the available supply of cereals in
the world market in 1999. Considering the importance of the European Union on the world
wheat market, one would expect a smaller price impact. 
In the second year of the set-aside program (2000), increased wheat production in the
European Union (due to higher relative wheat prices in 1999) dramatically reduces internal
prices. The reduced internal prices in combination with the increase in world prices, due to
reduced production in other parts of the world,8 allows the European Union to export
without subsidy and effectively links their wheat market to the world market. In the second
and third years of the set-aside program, prices for wheat, corn and soybean range from
26 percent to 32 percent above baseline levels.9 In Figure 4, it is apparent that although the
set-aside program acts to raise prices, it does not return them to the high levels observed in
the mid-1990s.
Following the removal of the set-aside program, all the major grain and oilseed commodity
prices return to the baseline price levels relatively quickly. In the first year following the
program (2002), coarse grain prices adjust most dramatically—falling well below baseline
levels—as favourable returns in 2001 and increased available area result in a substantial
increase in supply. Also, the decline in demand caused by less livestock also contributes to
this reduction. Livestock producers react to the lower level of profitability—a result of higher
feed prices caused by the set-aside program in 1999–2001 (the first three years). Similarly,
wheat prices decline below baseline levels as favourable returns spur increased production.
While oilseed prices decline in 2002 relative to 2001, they are still slightly above baseline
levels but they continue to decline well below baseline levels in 2003. By 2004, most of the
shock has filtered through and major grain and oilseed prices are generally close to initial
baseline levels and consequently are still well below the high level of the mid-1990s. These
results suggest that to keep prices from returning to low baseline levels, a permanent set-
aside program would be necessary.
6. The impact on the canola price is smaller because most of the oilseed land set aside in this program
concerns soybeans since the United States and Argentina are key players on the world oilseed market.
As a result, the world oilseed meal market experiences a more severe shortage than the vegetable oil
market since soybean  has the highest meal content of all the oilseeds. For that reason, the world price of
vegetable oil is less affected and as a result, the price of canola does not increase as much as the price of
soybeans. 
7. The model is built on the implicit assumption that the European Union will not reduce subsidized
exports below WTO limits to protect local consumers when prices reach a level well above the
intervention price. If on the contrary, they decided to reduce subsidized exports to moderate the increase
in the internal  price, then the local consumption would be higher, production would be lower, and the
world price impact would be stronger.
8. Wheat production outside the European Union falls in 2000 in the set-aside scenario because of higher
relative returns in 1999 for coarse grains and oilseeds. 
9. Readers should not extrapolate these price increases directly into farm income gains in Canada because
production would be lower under this scenario and farmers would incur costs to maintain a permanent
cover. A Market Analysis of a Set-aside Program 11
To show the impact of a permanent 10 percent set-aside program on international markets,
we extended the set-aside program through 2006. Since this scenario is simply an extension
of the initial shock, the results in the first three years (1999–2001) are identical. In Table 1, we
present the impacts on world prices in the first three years and then show the difference
between the three-year and eight-year scenarios for the average price changes of major
commodities. In the first scenario, the average price for wheat, corn and soybeans actually
falls 3.5 percent, 5.3 percent and 2.7 percent, respectively, below baseline levels over the
2002–2006 period (i.e. after the completion of the set-aside program). Over the same period,
because the set-aside program is maintained in the second scenario, the average price is
higher than in the baseline by 15.4 percent, 16.9 percent and 25.4 percent, respectively, for
wheat, corn and soybeans. For the average price increase over the entire scenario period
(1999–2006), the three-year scenario results in a 6.1 percent, 8.3 percent and 9.4 percent
increase in wheat, corn and soybean prices, respectively, while the eight-year scenario results
in an increase of 17.9 percent, 22.1 percent and 26.4 percent, respectively.
Supply response
Two factors limit the size of the price increase—slippage and free riding. Slippage is the
difference between the 10 percent shift in supply (through area) introduced in the model and
the effective reduction of grain and oilseed production in the five major countries. The
reasons for slippage are numerous. Producers first remove marginal lower-yielding land
from production which results in a lower than average drop in production. They intensify
their production practices (e.g. increase fertilizer and other input applications) on remaining
land to take advantage of improved returns. They shift land that was previously not
dedicated to grain and oilseed production (e.g. special crops, pasture, fallow) to grain and
oilseed production.
Free riding corresponds to the additional production above baseline levels from non-
participating countries (Brazil, Mexico, Russia and many other developing countries). The
higher prices resulting from the set-aside program will obviously encourage the non-
Table 1: Price impact resulting from a 10 percent set-aside program for wheat, coarse 
grains and oilseeds in Argentina, Australia, Canada, the European Union and 







1999 2000 2001 2002-2006 1999-2006 2002-2006 1999-2006
Wheat 14.0 26.3 26.1 -3.5 6.1 15.4 17.9
Corn 33.1 27.3 32.2 -5.3 8.3 16.9 22.1
Soybean 31.1 30.8 26.9 -2.7 9.4 24.5 26.4
Soybean meal 25.6 31.1 24.4 -2.6 8.5 21.0 23.3
Soybean oil 4.9 4.4 4.5 0.1 1.8 5.1 4.9
Crushing margin -37.7 -10.8 -15.6 3.5 -5.8 -30.6 -27.112 A Market Analysis of a Set-aside Program
participating countries to expand production of these commodities through either increased
land use or increased yields. Both of these situations will moderate the effect of the area
reduction in the five major exporters on world grain and oilseed prices.
See Figure 5 for the impacts of slip-
page (from area allocation only)
and free riding on the effectiveness
of the set-aside program. In the
AGLINK model, the producer’s
decision-making process is one of
naive expectations (i.e. the prices
observed last year influence this
year’s planting). This representa-
tion of expectation explains why
the reduction in grain and oilseed
area in the first year (1999) is
exactly equal to the full amount of
the set-aside program.10 With the
reduction of grain and oilseed pro-
duction in 1999, prices rise substantially.
In 2000, producers who are affected by world prices begin to react to the much stronger
returns associated with grain and oilseed production. Only 46 percent of the initial set-aside
area gets reflected at the world level. Slippage occurs in the participating countries as
producers re-allocate land that is still available for crop production to grains and oilseeds,
reducing the effective set-aside area by 9 percent. In addition to slippage, free riding of the
non-participating countries increases the land dedicated to grain and oilseed production,
reducing the effective set-aside area by 45 percent.
In 2001, only 42 percent of the set-aside area gets reflected at the world level as increased
slippage in the participating countries and continued free riding by non-participating
countries (mostly from developing countries) reduce the effective amount of set-aside land
by 20 percent and 38 percent, respectively.
On average over the 2002–2006 period, because of slippage (26 percent) and free riding
(42 percent), only one third (32 percent) of the original shift in supply is reflected in the world
harvested area of those commodities.11
In addition, the increase in yield in many countries of the world reduces even more the
effectiveness of the set-aside program as can be seen in Table 2. The potential world
production reduction in 2001, for example, was 80 million tonnes but the effective decline
was only 26 million tonnes because producers in many parts of  the world reacted to the
higher prices of cereals and oilseeds and adjusted area and yield.
The level of area slippage varies by country (Table 2). In Argentina, there is no area slippage
since the amount of grain and oilseed land set aside over the three-year period remains at
10. In reality, producers would probably react in the first year because they would be expecting an increase
in prices from the set-aside program.
11. Brazilian oilseed supply response has increased recently. This increase is not well captured in AGLINK
because the model is based on time-series econometric estimation. The free riding effect would be even
larger with an up-dated Brazilian component.
Figure 5: Effectiveness of set-aside program, accounting for 














Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4-8
Set-aside Slippage Free RiderA Market Analysis of a Set-aside Program 13
100 percent of the 1996–1998 average. The reason for this limited amount of slippage is tied
directly to the competition for land between the cattle and crop sectors. In the MERCOSUR12
region, the large increase in feed prices has a considerable impact on poultry prices which
ultimately leads to an increase in beef demand (largely from Brazil) and higher beef prices in
the region. Being a member of MERCOSUR, Argentina experiences higher beef prices which
ensures that the relative returns from crop and cattle production remain relatively
unchanged and thus none of the pasture area is converted to crop production. But
production in Argentina does not fall by the full amount of the area reduction since yields
are higher under those more favourable world prices (see Table 2).
In Australia, Canada and the United States, the increase in cattle prices is much smaller than
in Argentina and this increase partially explains why the level of area slippage is higher in
these countries. In the European Union, the level of area slippage is even more pronounced
due to the absence of an increase in cattle prices. Because of the BSE crisis in the European
Union, we assume that the increases in pork and poultry prices resulting from higher feed
prices would not shift beef demand sufficiently to allow for an increase in the beef price
above the purchasing price under the private stock holding scheme. Since European
producers would also adjust yields, the production of cereals and oilseeds would decline on
average by only 44 percent of the potential reduction from that set-aside program in 2000 and
2001.
Livestock sector
The large increases in feed prices from 1999 to 2001 that are the result of the set-aside
program have a negative global impact on the profitability of livestock producers. The
increase in cost leads to an upward shift in supply which results in a decline in livestock
production and an increase in the prices of livestock products. Larger impacts are observed
for non-ruminants (hogs, poultry and layers) than for ruminants (cattle and sheep) in the first
three years of the scenario as cereal and oilseed protein meals represent a much larger share
of the variable costs of non-ruminant production. Due to the dynamics in the livestock sector,
12. MERCOSUR is the common market of the South and involves four countries: Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay and Uruguay.











Argentina 2.1 100 100 101 100 70
Australia 1.7 100 87 79 83 83
Canada 2.5 100 93 81 87 87
European Union 4.7 100 83 68 75.5 44
United States 8.9 100 94 80 87 81
Big Five 19.9 100 91 80 85.5 71
World 19.9 100 46 42 44 3714 A Market Analysis of a Set-aside Program
production remains lower than the baseline level when the set-aside program ends. The
resulting lower demand for feed explains, in part, why grain and oilseed prices in 2002 are
lower than in the baseline. The decline is particularly strong for coarse grains which are the
major feed ingredient for livestock.
Number of players
Although the central focus of the set-aside program is the inclusion of the five largest
exporters, there may be some resistance from the European Union and the United States
which already have substantial land diversion programs. The European Union has a
mandatory set-aside program which effectively amounts to the 10 percent set-aside
calculated for the scenarios. The United States has a significant amount of grain and oilseed
land in the Conservation Reserve Program and may be reluctant to set aside an additional
10 percent of grain and oilseed area. Currently, the amount of land in this program is about
equal to the 10 percent set-aside area calculated for the scenarios.
Assuming that the European Union and the United States are unwilling to commit additional
land to the set-aside program, we produced a third scenario with Argentina, Australia and
Canada being the only participants. The impact on world prices compared with the first
scenario is much smaller, as one would expect. While the weighted average three-year price
effect in the first scenario for the groups of commodities concerned was 27.7 percent, in this
reduced participation scenario, the average impact falls to 6.8 percent.
Since there may be limited interest in a set-aside program involving only these three
countries, Argentina and Australia may not be interested in participating. For this reason, we
simulated a fourth scenario to show the potential impact on world grain and oilseed prices if
Canada were the only country to undertake the 10 percent set-aside program. As one would
expect, the impact on the weighted average world prices is even smaller at 2.9 percent.
Limitations
Slippage and free riding are partially represented in the AGLINK model and they give some
indication of the erosion of the initial effect of the supply shock. However, there are other
factors not captured by the model that would likely further reduce the size of the estimated
price increase. For example, many of the agricultural policies in the AGLINK model are
exogenous and therefore do not react to significant changes in the market situation. In the
context of the first and second scenarios which involve the participation of the five largest
exporters, it may not be realistic to assume that countries concerned about food security
would not react to the set-aside program by modifying their own agricultural policies to
stimulate local production. For instance, China moved toward a more self-sufficient grain
policy following the 1995/1996 spike in world prices. In addition, the importing countries
may adopt new technologies (e.g. GMOs) faster than what is assumed in the AGLINK model
if prices increase so dramatically. It is quite likely that adjustments would occur if we had a
sustained increase in prices and factors not currently captured by the model would act to
erode the price increase even more.A Market Analysis of a Set-aside Program 15
Past experience
An interesting question is whether or not these results are consistent with some of the
observed past experience involving similar programs. The main conclusion that we can draw
from past experience is this: the larger the elasticity of the excess demand of the non-
participating countries, the smaller the degree of success. This elasticity is influenced by the
number and the availability of substitutes on the demand side and by the ability of the non-
participating countries to increase production of the product(s) subject to the program. At
one extreme where failure is impossible, there is the case of a single country having reserves
of a non-renewable resource for which there are no substitutes. In general, to the extent that a
greater number of substitutes and countries can be included in the supply reducing program,
the greater the likelihood of success. That is to say, the probability of success of a single set-
aside program for wheat in Canada is much lower than a program involving the  five largest
exporters of wheat, coarse grains and oilseeds.
In the past, supply reducing programs (and/or public stock holdings) involving agricultural
products have not been very successful. Countries (or regions) representing a very large
share of world production attempted to use these programs to regulate world agricultural
market prices in the last 20 years. Examples as varied as maple syrup in Quebec, cocoa in
Ivory Coast, cereals in the United States and wool in Australia have all failed. In all cases, the
availability of substitutes and/or the ability of non-participating countries to increase
production created the following situation: prices were maintained in the short term which
increased the incentive for free riders to increase production. Free riding forced the country
operating the program to increase stock holdings and/or to reduce production to support
prices. This resulted in a declining market share and eventually this type of program became
unsustainable.A Market Analysis of a Set-aside Program 17
Conclusions
In undertaking this analysis, we found that a 10 percent set-aside program introduced by the
major five exporters would have a significant short-term impact on world grain and oilseed
prices. Over the three years (1999–2001) in which the 10 percent set-aside program is in place,
the average prices for wheat, corn and soybeans increase 22.1 percent, 30.9 percent and
29.6 percent, respectively. Following the removal of the set-aside program (2002–2006),
prices drop quickly and are on average below the initial baseline levels by 3.5 percent,
5.3 percent and 2.7 percent, respectively. The average increase for wheat, corn and soybeans
over the entire scenario period (1999–2006) is 6.1 percent, 8.3 percent and 9.4 percent,
respectively. The results from the three-year set-aside scenario appear to indicate that the
program has only delayed the return, by three years, to relatively low prices. These results
suggest that a permanent set-aside program would be necessary to keep prices from
returning to relatively low baseline levels.
We undertook the second scenario to extend the set-aside program to the eight-year period of
the 2000 AAFC Medium Term Policy Baseline. While this scenario did increase the size of the
average price impact over the entire period—17.9 percent, 22.1 percent and 26.4 percent,
respectively, for wheat, corn and soybeans—the impact is nonetheless significantly less than
in 1999 due to changes in the world supply and demand. The actual impact on major grain
and oilseed prices in the last five years is significantly reduced and is on average only
63 percent of the impact in the first three years.
Two factors which mitigated the size of the price increase were slippage in participating
countries and free riding in non-participating countries. In the third year (2001) of the set-
aside program, the effect at the world level of the supply shift has been reduced to 42 percent
of the initial shock. Slippage accounts for 20 percent as an increasing amount of the
remaining land is re-allocated to higher-return grain and oilseed production. Free riding of
the non-participating countries who do not offer subsidy to their cereal and oilseed sectors
further erodes the set-aside supply shock by 38 percent. The extent to which slippage and
free riding erode the effect of supply shock is most apparent when looking at the average
levels observed in the eight-year scenario where on average in the last five years, slippage
has increased to 26 percent and free riding to 42 percent. The actual reduction in harvested
area corresponds to only 32 percent of the initial set-aside shock. Also since yields are higher18 A Market Analysis of a Set-aside Program
under this scenario, the actual reduction in production corresponds to only 27 percent of the
potential reduction.
The results of the analysis are consistent with past experience. With five countries and more
than one commodity involved, the impact on world prices would be significant. If the set-
aside program can be maintained on a permanent basis, higher prices can be extended for
some time. However, based on past experience and on the result of the eight-year scenario,
non-participating countries will substantially increase their share of the world market,
eventually making the long-term viability of such a program questionable. The impact on
world prices is considerably less if the European Union and the United States were unwilling
to participate because they already have substantial land diversion programs. The impact is
negligible if Canada were the only country to undertake the 10 percent set-aside program.A Market Analysis of a Set-aside Program A-1
Appendix A:
Results of the three-year and eight-year set-aside scenarios of a 10 percent set-
aside program for wheat, coarse grains and oilseeds in Argentina, Australia,
Canada, the European Union and the United States






1999 2000 2001 2002-2006 1999-2006 2002-2006 1999-2006

















Corn 33.1 27.3 32.2 -5.3 8.3 16.9 22.1
Soybeans 31.1 30.8 26.9 -2.7 9.4 24.5 26.4
Soybean meal 25.6 31.1 24.4 -2.6 8.5 21.0 23.3
Soybean oil 4.9 4.4 4.5 0.1 1.8 5.1 4.9
Crushing margin -37.7 -10.8 -15.6 3.5 -5.8 -30.6 -27.1
US livestock
Steers 3.0 7.3 8.4 0.2 2.5 6.5 6.4
Hogs 2.8 14.8 18.4 -0.3 4.3 10.9 11.3
Poultry 5.5 10.3 10.6 -0.6 2.9 7.8 8.2
Eggs 7.1 14.2 12.9 -0.6 3.9 8.4 9.5
Milk 0.2 2.2 3.0 0.8 1.2 3.1 2.6
World dairy
Butter 2.4 2.2 2.8 -0.3 0.8 2.3 2.4
Skim milk powder 0.8 3.4 4.2 0.8 1.5 3.7 3.4
Cheese 0.6 2.5 2.6 0 0.7 1.8 1.8A-2 A Market Analysis of a Set-aside Program






1999 2000 2001 2002-2006 1999-2006 2002-2006 1999-2006
Big five
Wheat area -10.7* -10.7 -7.3 1.2 -2.8 -6.9 -7.9
Wheat production -9.2 -8.0 -5.1 1.0 -2.1 -5.5 -6.3
Coarse grains area -10.4* -7.5 -7.0 1.5 -2.2 -4.9 -6.2
Coarse grains prod. -10 -7.1 -6.4 1.3 -2.1 -4.6 -5.8
Oilseed area -9.6* -9.7 -10.3 -0.6 -4.1 -11.5 -10.9
Oilseed production -9.3 -9.5 -9.9 -0.7 -4.0 -11.4 -10.7
Non-participating countries
Wheat area 0.0 0.7 1.3 0.3 0.4 1.3 1.1
Wheat production 0.1 1.3 1.9 0.4 0.7 2.0 1.6
Coarse grains area 0.0 2.5 1.5 0.0 0.5 1.7 1.5
Coarse grains prod. 0.2 3.2 2.3 0.1 0.8 2.4 2.2
Oilseed area 0.0 2.7 2.9 0.7 1.2 2.8 2.5
Oilseed production 0.5 8.1 8.1 1.0 2.7 6.8 6.4
World
Wheat area -3.2 -2.8 -1.4 0.6 -0.6 -1.2 -1.7
Wheat production -3.5 -2.4 -0.8 0.6 -0.4 -0.9 -1.4
Coarse grains area -2.3 0.2 -0.4 0.3 -0.1 0.2 -0.2
Coarse grains prod. -4.7 -1.6 -1.8 0.7 -0.6 -0.8 -1.5
Oilseed area -4.6 -3.2 -3.2 0.1 -1.3 -3.6 -3.6
Oilseed production -5.2 -2.2 -2.2 0.0 -1.2 -3.4 -3.3
Non-ruminant -0.7 -1.6 -1.8 -0.1 -0.6 -1.5 -1.4
Milk -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.3
Beef in Pacific -0.1 -0.3 -0.6 -0.2 -0.3 -0.7 -0.6
* The percentage reduction in the area of the five largest exporting countries in 1999 may be slightly different
than 10 percent because the amount of land set aside corresponds to 10 percent of the average harvested
area in 1996-1998.A Market Analysis of a Set-aside Program A-3






1999 2000 2001 2002-2006 1999-2006 2002-2006 1999-2006
Canadian prices
Corn, Chatham 32.6 23.7 28.4 -4.8 7.6 14.5 19.7
Barley, Lethbridge 29.8 23.7 28.1 -4.4 7.4 15.0 19.6
Soybeans, Chatham 33.8 33.5 29.5 -3.0 10.2 27.0 29.0
Canola, Vancouver 24.6 21.2 19.2 -1.8 7.0 18.7 19.8
Wheat, final realized price 14.3 25.9 26.1 -3.5 6.1 16.2 18.4
Steers 2.9 7.2 8.4 0.2 2.5 6.5 6.4
Hogs 3.3 17.2 21.8 -0.3 5.1 12.7 13.2
Poultry 6.5 14.3 14.3 -0.4 4.1 10.3 10.8
Eggs 5.2 11.4 11.5 -0.4 3.3 8.5 8.8
Milk, P9* 0 2.7 2.7 0.2 0.8 2.2 2.1
Canadian production
Wheat area -11.1 -14.8 -7.6 0.4 -3.9 -9.8 -10.3
Wheat production -11.1 -14.8 -7.6 0.4 -3.9 -9.8 -10.3
Coarse grains area -11.2 -7.0 -10.2 -0.1 -3.6 -7.2 -8.1
Coarse grains prod. -10.8 -7.0 -10.3 -0.2 -3.6 -7.8 -8.4
Oilseed area -8.3 -2.2 -6.0 0.3 -1.9 -6.6 -6.2
Oilseed production -8.4 -2.7 -5.9 0.3 -1.9 -6.5 -6.2
Beef 0.2 -1.3 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1
Pork 0.0 -1.7 -1.7 0.1 -0.3 -0.6 -0.8
Poultry -1.2 -1.9 -1.6 0.1 -0.5 -1.2 -1.3
Eggs -0.7 -1.4 -1.5 0.0 -0.4 -1.0 -1.1
Milk 0.0 -0.5 -0.9 -0.1 -0.2 -0.7 -0.6
* P9 is a pool price involving nine provinces.A Market Analysis of a Set-aside Program B-1
Appendix B:
Results of the three-year set-aside scenario involving five countries (Argentina,
Australia, Canada, the European Union and the United States), three countries
(Australia, Argentina and Canada) and one country (Canada).
Table B1: Impact on crop prices
Difference between
scenario and baseline
1999 2000 2001 Average 1999 2000 2001 Average
World prices
Wheat
Baseline 109.5 124.2 138.9 124.2 — — — —
5 Countries 124.8 157.0 175.2 152.3 15.3 32.7 36.3 28.1
3 Countries 114.2 134.8 152.5 133.8 4.7 10.6 13.6 9.6
1 Country 111.6 128.8 144.1 128.1 2.1 4.5 5.2 3.9
Corn
Baseline 89.8 91.1 101.9 94.3 — — — —
5 Countries 119.6 115.9 134.7 123.4 29.8 24.8 32.8 29.1
3 Countries 95.5 97.4 107.4 100.1 5.6 6.3 5.6 5.8
1 Country 92.3 94.1 105.0 97.1 2.5 3.1 3.1 2.9
Soybeans
Baseline 176.4 167.6 166.2 170.1 — — — —
5 Countries 231.3 219.3 211.0 220.5 54.8 51.7 44.7 50.4
3 Countries 191.0 180.0 176.4 182.5 14.6 12.4 10.2 12.4
1 Country 180.9 171.8 169.4 174.0 4.4 4.2 3.1 3.9
Soybean meal
Baseline 180.7 176.1 173.9 176.9 — — — —
5 Countries 226.9 230.9 216.4 224.7 46.2 54.8 42.5 47.8
3 Countries 193.1 189.3 183.0 188.5 12.4 13.2 9.1 11.6
1 Country 184.7 180.8 176.8 180.8 4.0 4.7 2.9 3.9B-2 A Market Analysis of a Set-aside Program
Soybean oil
Baseline 351.2 352.9 371.7 358.6 — — — —
5 Countries 368.3 368.5 388.5 375.1 17.1 15.6 16.8 16.5
3 Countries 354.6 355.6 375.0 361.7 3.4 2.7 3.3 3.1
1 Country 352.4 353.9 373.0 359.8 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.2
Table B2: Impact on livestock prices
Difference between
scenario and baseline
1999 2000 2001 Average 1999 2000 2001 Average
US beef price
Baseline 232.7 251.3 254.8 246.2 — — — —
5 Countries 239.6 269.7 276.3 261.8 6.9 18.4 21.5 15.6
3 Countries 234.3 255.9 260.0 250.1 1.6 4.6 5.3 3.8
1 Country 233.3 253.2 257.1 247.9 0.6 1.9 2.3 1.6
US pork price
Baseline 102.6 138.6 126.7 122.7 — — — —
5 Countries 105.5 159.2 150.0 138.2 2.9 20.5 23.3 15.5
3 Countries 103.3 143.5 132.4 126.4 0.7 4.9 5.7 3.8
1 Country 102.9 140.6 129.2 124.2 0.3 2.0 2.4 1.6
Northern Europe cheese price
Baseline 175.4 179.1 187.5 180.7 — — — —
5 Countries 176.4 183.6 192.4 184.1 1.0 4.5 4.9 3.5
3 Countries 175.6 180.3 188.7 181.5 0.2 1.1 1.2 0.8
1 Country 175.5 179.6 188.0 181.0 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.4
Northern Europe butter price
Baseline 148.0 149.7 156.3 151.3 — — — —
5 Countries 151.6 153.0 160.7 155.1 3.6 3.3 4.4 3.8
3 Countries 148.7 150.2 157.2 152.0 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.7
1 Country 148.3 149.9 156.7 151.6 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3
Northern Europe skim milk price
Baseline 131.5 145.9 150.8 142.7 — — — —
5 Countries 132.5 150.9 157.2 146.9 1.0 5.0 6.4 4.1
3 Countries 131.8 147.3 152.4 143.8 0.4 1.3 1.6 1.1
1 Country 131.6 146.5 151.4 143.2 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.4
Table B1: Impact on crop prices (Continued)
Difference between
scenario and baseline
1999 2000 2001 Average 1999 2000 2001 Average